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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of identifying and estimating the normal-form payoff pa-
rameters of a simultaneous, discrete game of complete information where the equilibrium
concept employed is correlated equilibrium rather than Nash equilibrium. We show that
once we extend the equilibrium concept from Nash equilibrium to the correlated equi-
librium, the identification and estimation of game-theoretic econometric models become
simpler, since this extension avoids the usual requirement of computing all equilibria of
games. To deal with the presence of multiple equilibria, unlike most other work on empir-
ical games, we make use of the moment inequality restrictions induced by the underlying
game-theoretic econometric models without making equilibrium selection assumptions.
The resulting identified features of the model are sets of parameters such that the choice
probabilities predicted by the econometric model are consistent with the empirical choice
probabilities estimated from the data. The importance sampling technique is used to
reduce computational burden and overcome the non-smoothness problems. We also show
that the model selection tests for moment inequality models can be used to test equilib-
rium concepts such as correlated equilibrium versus Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Game theory is one of the cornerstones of modern economic theory, and much progress
has been made in clarifying the nature of strategic interaction in economic models. It is
the benchmark theoretical model for analyzing strategic interactions among a handful of
players. Given the importance of gaming in economic theory, the empirical analysis of
games has been the focus of a recent literature in econometrics and industrial organization.
Econometrically, a discrete game-theoretic econometric model is a generalization of a
standard discrete choice model, such as the conditional logit or multinomial probit model.
An agent’s utility is often assumed to be a linear function of covariates and a random
preference shock. However, unlike a discrete choice model, utility is also allowed to depend
on the actions of other agents. Such modeling strategy was first suggested by the seminal
work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991).
Although there are numerous studies on both methodology and empirical applications
of game-theoretic econometric models, the most widely studies is the class of incomplete
information static games and dynamic games1. The complete information games received
fewer studies due to its computational complexity, since it involves multidimensional in-
tegrals, moreover, complete information assumption will generally induce the presence of
multiple equilibria Morris and Shihn (2003). Dealing with multiple equilibria is a difficult
task because a particular realization of observables and a particular value of the payoff pa-
rameter vector may be consistent with difference outcomes of the model. For the presence
of multidimensional integrals, Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and Ciliberto and Tamer
(2009) provide simulation-based estimators for the static complete information game. For
the presence of multiple equilibria, there are three main different approaches adopted
by the existing research. The first one is that introducing a specific equilibrium selec-
1Studies of incomplete information static games include Sweeting (2005), Seim (2006), Aradillas-Lopez
(2007, 2010) and Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010), while the studies of dynamic game in-
cludes Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) among others.
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tion mechanism to determine which equilibrium will be played among several equilibria,
Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and Jia (2008) use such approach to studies empirical
static games. While a specific equilibrium selection mechanism can provide enough in-
formation for identifying the underlying game, in general, we have limited knowledge
about the equilibrium selection mechanism, and any misspecificaiton about it will lead
inconsistent estimation. The second approach which first used by Bresnahan and Reiss
(1990) is that transforming the outcome variable of the game from action profile to some
other variable, which satisfies that, even if there are multiple equilibria in the game, it
does a unique prediction of this particular variable, such as the number of entrants in the
market used by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990). This is a useful method as long as we can
find such a particular variable. The last approach proposed by Tamer (2003) is that doing
inference of the empirical games without making any assumption about the equilibrium
selection mechanism, the cost is that in general, one can only achieve the partial iden-
tification of the model, Berry and Tamer (2007) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) based
on this method formally study the empirical static games. Although these approaches
can handle the inference in the presence of multiple equilibria, a common practical issue
is that all of them require the computation all the Nash equilibria of underlying game,
which may result in heavy computational burden if not impossible when dealing with
large games2.
Here, we depart from the common used equilibrium concept – Nash equilibrium, and
assume that the outcome of the game is generated by a more broad rational rule – cor-
related equilibrium which proposed by Aumann (1974, 1987). A most interesting fea-
ture of this extension of equilibrium concept is that the identification and estimation of
empirical games become simpler, even if it spreads the corresponding equilibrium set3.
2Mckelvey and Mclennan (1996) analyze the computational method for computing the Nash equilib-
rium set for general game and point the difficulty associated with this issue.
3Chwe (2007) also study the identification of games based on correlated equilibrium in a no random-
ness environment.
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The advantages of correlated equilibrium in the context of identification comes from its
convexity, that is, any aggregation of correlated equilibria is also a correlated equilibria
which is not true for Nash equilibrium. We also adopt the partial identification approach
to deal with the presence of multiple equilibria following Berry and Tamer (2007) and
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), where the identified set is characterized by moment inequal-
ity restrictions. But our approach does not require the computation of all the equilibria
(either correlated or Nash), but only needs to compute some ”extreme” equilibria, which
can be obtained from simple linear programming. This does not mean that computing
the whole set of correlated equilibria is simple4, the key feature is that it does not need
the whole set of equilibria. The importance sampling technique is used to approximate
the multi-dimensional integrals. Given the existing research on empirical games based
on Nash equilibrium, and the results established in this paper based on correlated equi-
librium, we also provide a test framework for testing equilibrium concepts based on the
moment inequality model selection test developed by Shi (2010). The nested relation-
ship between Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium makes this test similar to the
famous Hausman test (Hausman, 1978).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the general discrete
simultaneous-move game with complete information to be estimated and formulate its
equilibrium conditions based on correlated equilibrium, several important properties of
correlated equilibrium are also presented. In section 3 we discuss the problem of partial
identification of the model. Section 4 describes the procedure for estimating the identified
set which formulated in section 3, which also includes the important issues about impor-
tance sampling approximation of the multiple integrals and the computation of ”extreme”
correlated equilibrium. Section 5 introducing a test procedure for testing correlated equi-
librium versus Nash equilibrium. A simple Monte Carlo experiment is conducted in section
4Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (2008) develop a polynomial-time algorithm for finding correlated
equilibria and also have a discussion about the difficulty in computing the whole set of correlated equi-
libria.
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6. Section 7 simply concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There are T independent repetitions of a simultaneous-move (normal form) discrete game
of complete information. In each game there are i = 1, ..., N players. In each repetition
of these games, each player i chooses a action ai from the finite set of actions Ai simulta-
neously. Define A = ×iAi and let a = (a1, ..., aN) denote a generic element of A. Player
i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility is a mapping ui : A
N → R, where R is the
real line. We will sometimes drop the subscript t for simplicity when no ambiguity would
arise.
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), assume that the vNM utility of player i
can be written as:
ui(a, xi, ǫi; θ1) = Πi(xi, a; θ1) + ǫi(a) (1)
where a ∈ AN . In Equation (1), player i’s vNM utility from outcome a is the sum of two
terms. The first term Πi(xi, a; θ1) is a function which depends on action profile (outcome)
a, the vector of actions taken by all of the players, x, the players’ characteristics and some
other variables which influence utility, and parameters θ1, covariates x are observed by the
econometrician. The second term ǫi(a), is a random preference shock which reflects the
information about utility that is common knowledge to the players (since we study the
game with complete information) but not observed by the econometrician. Unlike most
other study on empirical games, here the preference shocks depend on the entire vector of
actions a, not just the actions taken by player i. As argued by Bajari, Hong, and Ryan
(2010), this is a more general setting. For example, in a simple entry game, the unobserved
information about one player’s payoff to the econometrician may not only vary across his
own actions but also across the actions of other players. Let ǫi denote the vector of
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the individual shocks ǫi(a) and ǫ denote the vector of all preference shocks, ǫi(a) are
assumed to be independent with a density gi(ǫi(a)|θ2) and joint distribution g(ǫ|θ2) =∏
i
∏
a∈A
gi(ǫi(a)|θ2), where θ2 denotes parameters of the distribution.
Given these T independent repetitions of the game with the above structure, the
researcher can observe covariates xt and the action profile a
o
t chosen by all players in
each repetition these games. Unlike most other studies of empirical games, here we as-
sume that all players choose their action according to the correlated equilibrium rather
than Nash equilibrium, the studies of empirical games based on Nash equilibrium in-
clude Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) among others. As
a generalization of Nash equilibrium, Aumann (1974, 1987) provided a simple rationale
for equilibrium – correlated equilibrium, which is formulated in a manner that does away
with the dichotomy usually perceived between the ”Bayesian” and the ”game-theoretic”
view of the world. The most notable feature of the correlated equilibrium is that it does
not require explicit randomization on the part of the players. Formally, given the game
structure defined above, and let (Ω, π) be a probability space, Pi be a partition of Ω,
i = 1, ..., N , and let
Qi = {qi : Ω→ A|qi is Pi measurable} (2)
where the partition can be expressed as Pi = {Pi(ω)}ω∈Ω, and Pi(ω) is the element of
the partition containing ω. Then the original definition of correlated equilibrium can be
stated as:
Definition 2.1 (Correlated Equilibrium) The collection (Ω, π, {P}Ni=1, {qi}Ni=1) is a
correlated equilibrium if ∀i,
∑
ω
ui(q−i(ω), qi(ω))π(ω) ≥
∑
ω
ui(q−i(ω), τi(ω))π(ω), ∀τi ∈ Qi (3)
where for each i, qi is constant on each member of Pi.
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The intuition is that given the information received through ω, players maximize their
expected utility, and (3) are sufficient conditions for the utility maximization. The for-
mulation of a correlated equilibrium in Definition 2.1 leads itself to a broad range of
interpretations (e.g. sunspot equilibria), but from a computational point of view there
is a more natural formulation which is known as canonical correlated equilibrium, where
the state space is identified with the space of pure strategies, that is Ω = A = ×Ai, and
π is a distribution on A.
Definition 2.2 (Canonical Correlated Equilibrium) If the draw of π, ai is viewed
as the ”recommended” strategy and if this is the optimal choice for i–so that for each ai,∑
a−i ui(a
′
i, a−i)π(a−i|ai) is maximized by a′i = ai, that is
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, ai)π(a−i|ai) ≥
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, a
′
i)π(a−i|ai), ∀a′i ∈ Ai (4)
then π is called a canonical correlated equilibrium.
The canonical correlated equilibrium can be summarized as follows. A point a in A is
drawn according to the distribution π. Player i is informed of the ith component of a, ai
with the expectation that i will choose this action. Given π, player i can calculate the
conditional distribution over A−i and the conditional expected payoff from each choice
a′i :
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, a
′
i)π(a−i|ai). The inequality (4) asserts that if i is told ai, this is in fact a
best choice for i. Clearly, the formulation (4) is more tractable than (3), and the following
theorem states the strategic equivalence between the correlated equilibrium and canonical
correlated equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Let (Ω, π, {P}Ni=1, {qi}Ni=1) be a correlated equilibrium. Then there is a canon-
ical correlated equilibrium π∗ yielding the same distribution on actions and the same ex-
pected payoff to each player.
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Proof. See Bergin (2005).
Based this strategic equivalence, we will use canonical correlated equilibrium instead
of the correlated equilibrium formulated in Definition 2.1 and refer it as correlated equi-
librium. Also, based on Theorem 2.1, one can show the following useful properties:
Proposition 2.1 The set of Nash equilibrium payoffs is a subset of the set of correlated
equilibrium payoffs.
Proposition 2.2 The set of correlated equilibrium payoffs is a convex set.
Proposition 2.1 means that Nash equilibrium is the degenerated correlated equilibrium,
since the mixed strategy used by players is independent over set Ai, while correlated
equilibrium is the general distribution over the set A = ×iAi. The convexity will facilitate
the computation of correlated equilibrium, since any convex combination of correlated
equilibria is a correlated equilibrium, we will make use of these useful properties in the
identification and estimation sections. Here we illustrate these properties through a simple
2× 2 chicken game.
Example 2.1 (Chicken Game) Consider the following chicken game, each with two
actions: A1 = A2 = {stop, go}. The payoff matrix is:
S G
S (4, 4) (1, 5)
G (5, 1) (0, 0)
The following five distributions over A = {(S, S), (S,G), (G, S), (G,G)} all are the corre-
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lated equilibria of this game:
π1 = (0, 1, 0, 0)
π2 = (0, 0, 1, 0)
π3 = (
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
)
π4 = (0,
1
2
, 1
2
, 0)
π5 = (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0)
where π1 and π2 both are pure strategy equilibria, while π3 is a mixed strategy equilibrium
corresponding to both players playing the mixed strategy {1/2, 1/2}. The last two correlated
equilibria are the correlated equilibria which do not enter the set of Nash equilibrium.
Actually, by the convexity of correlated equilibrium, we know that this chicken game has
infinite correlated equilibria, the set of all the correlated equilibria is shown in figure (1),
which is a polytope with five vertices. Calvo-Armengol (2006) studies the property of sets
of all the correlated equilibria and Nash equilibria and the relationship between them in
general 2× 2 games.
The nested relationship between correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium makes
our test of equilibrium concepts similar to the famous Hausman test (Hausman, 1978).
If the equilibrium of the underlying game is generated by Nash equilibrium, but the
researcher estimates the game based on correlated equilibrium, then the estimates is
consistent but not efficient, while the equilibrium is generated by correlated equilibrium,
but the researcher estimates the game based on Nash equilibrium, then the estimates is
inconsistent.
Given the structure of the discrete normal form game discussed above, assume the
outcome of such games are generated by correlated equilibrium, which is any solution for
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Figure 1: Correlated Equilibrium Set in the Chicken Game
the distribution π over action profile set A that satisfies:
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, ai, xi, ǫi; θ1)π(a−i|ai) ≥
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, a
′
i, xi, ǫi; θ1)π(a−i|ai), ∀a′i ∈ Ai, i = 1, ..., N
(5)
Our task is to estimate and draw an inference about the parameters of payoff functions,
θ1, and the parameters of the distribution of random preference shocks, θ2, with the obser-
vation of the outcome ao, some exogenous covariates which affect the payoffs, x. Note that
the actual payoff levels are unobserved, i.e., they are latent variables. Before discussing
the identification issues, we introduce several notations. For any distribution which satis-
fies the equilibrium condition (5), e.g. the correlated equilibrium of the underlying game,
let
Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1)) (6)
10
denote the collection of them, this will be the set of all the correlated equilibria, where
u(x, ǫ; θ1) means that we can compute this set as long as we know the payoff functions
of each player. Let π(u(x, ǫ; θ1)) denote the generic elements of the set Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1)), for
purposes of exposition, we will sometimes simply refer it as π, and π ∈ Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1)). Note
that the correlated equilibrium relies on the exogenous covariates x, random preference
shock ǫ, and structural parameter θ1.
3 Identification
The general idea of the identification of game-theoretic econometric models is that
matching the choice probabilities predicted by the model and the empirical choice
probabilities estimated from the data, see Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010),
Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). As usual, the empirical
choice probabilities can be obtained from the data nonparametrically, but obtaining the
choice probabilities predicted by the game where the equilibrium concept employed is
correlated equilibrium is not practical without additional information on the equilibrium
selection mechanism, this is due to the presence of multiple equilibria, dealing with mul-
tiple equilibria complicates the identification problem. Unlike Bajari, Hong, and Ryan
(2010) which introduce a explicit equilibrium selection mechanism to achieve the point
identification of structural parameters, here we identify the game without making any
assumption on the equilibrium selection mechanism following the method proposed by
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) which study the same problem but use Nash equilibrium as
the equilibrium concept, the reason is that we do not have enough information to specify
any equilibrium selection mechanism Berry and Tamer (2007).
First enumerate the elements of A from a = {1, ...,#A}. A is the set of pure strategy
profiles and a ∈ A. Given a correlated equilibrium π ∈ Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1)) is a distribution
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over A, we have
π = (π(1), ..., π(a), ..., π(#A))′ (7)
and
#A∑
a=1
π(a) = 1;0 ≤ π(a) ≤ 1;∀a ∈ A (8)
Let Y be the set of potentially observable outcomes, since we assume that the observable
outcome of the game is the equilibrium actions chosen by all the players, then Y = A. Let
Pr(y = a|x; θ) denote the the probability that action profile a be the equilibrium action
profile predicted by the model, where θ = (θ1, θ2), and Pr(y = a|x) be the empirical choice
probability identified from the data which does not rely on the model, thus, does not rely
on the parameters.
We introduce following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Compactness of Parameter Space) The parameter space Θ is com-
pact.
Assumption 2 (Scale and Location Normalizations) The payoffs of one action for
each player are fixed at a known constant.
Assumption 3 (Regularity Conditions of Random Shocks) The joint distribution
of ǫ = (ǫi(a)), G(ǫ|θ2) is independent, independent of x, and known to all agents
and the econometrician, and let g(ǫ|θ2) be the corresponding density.
Assumption 4 (Identification of Pr(y|x)) The econometrician observes data that
identify Pr(y = a|x), ∀a ∈ A.
Assumption 1 is critical for the construction the large sample property of our estima-
tor. The restriction in Assumption 2 is similar to the argument that we can normalize
the mean utility from the outside good equal to a constant, usually zero, in a standard
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discrete choice model. One can clearly find that from the equilibrium condition (5) that
adding a constant to all deterministic payoffs does not perturb the set of equilibria, so
a location normalization is necessary. A scale normalization is also necessary, as multi-
plying all deterministic payoffs by a positive constant does not alter the equilibrium, and
this restriction is subsumed in the Assumption 3, where we assume that the researcher
know the joint distribution of random preference shocks, identification in this game with
unspecified distribution is complicated if not impossible. Finally, Assumption 4 requires
that researchers can identify the empirical choice probability from data, clearly, this is
necessary since we match this probability with the choice probability predicted by the
model to identify the model.
As discussed before, the set of correlated equilibrium, Sπ(u(θ, x, ǫ)) may be a non-
singleton set, and usually, it is a set with infinite elements. If Sπ(u(θ, x, ǫ)) is non-
singleton, in order to derive the choice probability predicted by the model, Pr(y = a|x; θ),
we need to introduce an equilibrium selection mechanism:
ψ(·|x, ǫ) : Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1))→ [0, 1]d[Spi(u(x,ǫ;θ1))] (9)
such that
ψ(·|x, ǫ) ≥ 0 (10)
∑
π∈Spi(u(x,ǫ;θ1))
ψ(π|x, ǫ) = 1 (11)
where d[Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1))] is the dimension of Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1)). This equilibrium selection
mechanism specifies the probability, ψ(π|x, ǫ), that any correlated equilibrium π ∈
Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1)) be the actual equilibrium. Since the d[Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1))] can be infinite, we
should use a continuos distribution to express this equilibrium selection mechanism, but
for purposes of exposition, we use the discrete distribution.
Given the equilibrium selection mechanism (9), the choice probability implied by the
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model can be written as:
Pr(y = a|x; θ) =
∫  ∑
π∈Spi(u(x,ǫ;θ1))
ψ(π|x, ǫ)π(a)

 dG(ǫ|θ2) (12)
where π(a) is the probability of action profile a associated with a correlated equilibrium
π, and ψ(π|x, ǫ) is the probability that π be the final equilibrium, thus ψ(π|x, ǫ)π(a)
is the probability that action profile a be the final equilibrium action profile associ-
ated with a correlated equilibrium π. Clearly, action profile a also can be chosen with
other correlated equilibrium rather than π, thus the summation of these probability,∑
π∈Spi(u(x,ǫ;θ1))
ψ(π|x, ǫ)π(a), is the probability that action profile a be the final equilib-
rium action profile. Based on the choice probability implied by the model (12), the sharp
identified set for parameter θ = (θ1, θ2) is defined as:
Definition 3.1 (Sharp Identified Set) The sharp identified set for the parameter vec-
tor θ ∈ Θ is given by:
ΘI =


∃ψ, ∀a ∈ Y
θ ∈ Θ : such that: E[Pr(y = a|x)] = E[Pr(y = a|x; θ)]
= E

∫

 ∑
π∈Spi(u(x,ǫ;θ1))
ψ(π|x, ǫ)π(a)

 dG(ǫ|θ2)




(13)
Inference on the set ΘI based on (13) is not practically feasible since one needs to
deal with infinite dimensional nuisance parameters ψ(·|x, ǫ), this is due to the presence
of multiple equilibria, and note that the equilibrium selection mechanism also depends
on the unobserved random preference shock ǫ. We may specify a parametric equi-
librium selection mechanism as that it is characterized by finite parameters, such as
Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010), which estimate a normal form game based on Nash equi-
librium. The problem is that we do not have enough information to specify a particular
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equilibrium selection mechanism, and any misspecifiction of this mechanism will induce
the inconsistent estimation. One may also try to use refined equilibrium concept, such as
perfect correlated equilibrium (Dhillon and Mertens, 1996) or maximum entropy corre-
lated equilibrium (Ortiz, Schapire, and Kakade, 2007), the problem is that even based on
such refined equilibrium, one also can not guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium. In the
spirite of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), here we leave the equilibrium selection mechanism
unspecified but exploiting the fact that the equilibrium selection mechanism ψ(π|x, ǫ) is
a probability and hence bounded between zero and one to derive a outer identified set for
the model.
Since the equilibrium selection mechanism ψ(π|x, ǫ) is a probability distribution, then
0 ≤ ψ(π|x, ǫ) ≤ 1, ∀π ∈ Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1)) (14)
Based on this natural property of probability, we can derive an outer identified set for
the parameter θ. Formally, let Ha1 (θ,X) denote the lower bound of the choice probability
of action profile a implied by the model, Pr(y = a|x; θ), and Ha2 (θ,X) the upper bound,
then:
Ha1 (θ,X) = min
∫  ∑
π∈Spi(u(x,ǫ;θ1))
ψ(π|x, ǫ)π(a)

 dG(ǫ|θ2) (15)
Ha2 (θ,X) = max
∫  ∑
π∈Spi(u(x,ǫ;θ1))
ψ(π|x, ǫ)π(a)

 dG(ǫ|θ2) (16)
Given the exogenous covariates, X , and payoff parameter θ1, we collect the value of
random preference shocks ǫ such that the game admits π as unique equilibrium into the
set Rπ1 (θ1, X), and collect other value of random preference shocks that the game admits
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multiple equilibria into the set Rπ2 (θ1, X). Thus we have:
Ha1 (θ,X)
= min
∫  ∑
π∈Spi(u(x,ǫ;θ1))
ψ(π|x, ǫ)π(a)

 dG(ǫ|θ2) (17)
=
∫
Rpi
1
(θ,X)
π(a)dG(ǫ|θ2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+
∫
Rpi
2
(θ,X)
min{π(a) : π ∈ Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1))}dG(ǫ|θ2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
where part (1) means that when the game admits π as the unique equilibrium, then
the choice probability of a implied by the model, Pr(y = a|x; θ), is the probability of a
associated with the unique correlated equilibrium π, that is π(a). As long as the game
admits unique equilibrium, the action profile a will appear as the equilibrium action profile
with probability π(a), thus it enters the lower bound Ha1 (θ,X). Part (2) in (17) means
that when the game has multiple equilibria, we select one particular equilibrium from
these equilibria as the final equilibria, which is the one that puts the lowest probability
for action profile a. Clearly, the true equilibrium selection mechanism may put a lower
probability for this particular equilibrium, but select this equilibrium with probability one
do achieve the lower bound of Pr(y = a|x; θ) given the information on hand. Similarly,
the upper bound Ha2 (θ,X) can be derived as:
Ha2 (θ,X)
= max
∫  ∑
π∈Spi(u(x,ǫ;θ1))
ψ(π|x, ǫ)π(a)

 dG(ǫ|θ2) (18)
=
∫
Rpi
1
(θ,X)
π(a)dG(ǫ|θ2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+
∫
Rpi
2
(θ,X)
max{π(a) : π ∈ Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1))}dG(ǫ|θ2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
The meaning for the first part is same as (17), the probability associated with the unique
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equilibrium also enters the upper bound. When the game admits multiple equilibria, to
derive the upper bound of choice probability, we select another particular equilibrium
form these equilibria, that is the one puts the highest probability for the action profile a.
Although the true equilibrium selection mechanism may selects this equilibrium with a
lower probability, this selection does achieve the upper bound of Pr(y = a|x; θ), since any
other selection will select this particular equilibrium with probability no more than one.
Based on the lower bound and upper bound of the choice probability implied by the
model, we have:
Ha1 (θ,X) ≤ Pr(y = a|x; θ) ≤ Ha2 (θ,X) (19)
And when θ ∈ ΘI
E[Pr(y = a|x)] = E[Pr(y = a|x; θ)] (20)
Thus we can define the outer identified set for the model parameter θ as:
Definition 3.2 (Outer Identified Region) The outer identified set for model param-
eter θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ is
ΘO =


∀a ∈ Y
θ ∈ Θ : such that:
E[Ha1 (θ,X)] ≤ E[Pr(y = a|x)] ≤ E[Ha2 (θ,X)]


(21)
By introducing the following notations:
H1(θ,X) = (H
1
1 (θ,X), ..., H
a
1 (θ,X), ..., H
#A
1 (θ,X))
′
H2(θ,X) = (H
1
2 (θ,X), ..., H
a
2 (θ,X), ..., H
#A
2 (θ,X))
′
and
Pr (y|x) = (Pr(y = 1|x), ...,Pr(y = a|x), ...,Pr(y = #A|x))′
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Conditions for the outer identified set can be stated as:
E[H1(θ,X)] ≤ E[Pr(y|x)] ≤ E[H2(θ,X)] (22)
Actually, the outer identified set ΘO is broader than the sharp identified set ΘI . Given that
we do not have enough information about the equilibrium selection mechanism, the outer
identified set ΘO is the most thing we can learn about parameter θ from the underlying
game and observation. In general, the set is not a singleton, as it is characterized by the
moment inequality restrictions, and such model is called partial identified econometric
models, corresponding to usual point identified case.
4 Estimation
The estimation problem is based on the moment inequality model
E[H1(θ,X)] ≤ E[Pr (y|x)] ≤ E[H2(θ,X)] (23)
We follow Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) which provide a general framework
for moment inequality models to build consistent estimator for the outer identified set
ΘO. Since the upper and lower bounds in the moment conditions (23) contain the multi-
dimensional integrations, we first provide a simulation procedure to approximate these
integrations. Due to the discreteness problem associated with the simple monte Carlo
integration, in the spirit of Ackerberg (2009) and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010), we
make use of the importance sampling monte Carlo integration instead5.
5McFadden (1989) noted the ability to use importance sampling to smooth simulations which is
extended by Ackerberg (2009).
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4.1 Importance Sampling Approximation
Importance sampling is most noted for its ability to reduce simulation er-
ror and computational burden, and was first used in game-theoretic models by
Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010). First note that the correlated equilibrium depends on
the parameter θ1 only through the payoff function u, that is:
Ha1 (θ,X)
=
∫
Rpi
1
(θ,X)
π(a|u)dG(ǫ|θ2) +
∫
Rpi
2
(θ,X)
min{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1))}dG(ǫ|θ2)
Ha2 (θ,X)
=
∫
Rpi
1
(θ,X)
π(a|u)dG(ǫ|θ2) +
∫
Rpi
2
(θ,X)
max{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1))}dG(ǫ|θ2)
where π(a|u) and the set of correlated equilibria Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1)) both determined by the
payoff level u, and associated with θ1 only through u. Based on this property, we can
change variable of integration in and from ǫ to u. Let h(u|X, θ) denote the density of u,
conditional on x and θ. Based on the utility function ui(a, xi, ǫi; θ1) = Πi(xi, a; θ1) + ǫi(a)
and the density for ǫ, g(ǫ|θ2), h(u|X, θ) can be derived as:
h(u|X, θ) =
∏
i
∏
a∈A
g(ui(a)−Πi(xi, a; θ1)|θ2) (24)
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Then Ha1 (θ,X) and H
a
2 (θ,X) can be converted as
Ha1 (θ,X)
=
∫
Rpi
1
(θ,X)
π(a|u)dG(ǫ|θ2) +
∫
Rpi
2
(θ,X)
min{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1))}dG(ǫ|θ2) (25)
=
∫
R′
1
π(a|u)h(u|X, θ)du+
∫
R′
2
min{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)}h(u|X, θ)du
Ha2 (θ,X)
=
∫
Rpi
1
(θ,X)
π(a|u)dG(ǫ|θ2) +
∫
Rpi
2
(θ,X)
max{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u(x, ǫ; θ1))}dG(ǫ|θ2) (26)
=
∫
R′
1
π(a|u)h(u|X, θ)du+
∫
R′
2
max{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)}h(u|X, θ)du
where R′1 is collection of u such that the game admits unique equilibrium, and R
′
2 is the
collection of u that the game admits multiple equilibria. By introducing a importance
density q(u), rewrite (25) and (26) as:
Ha1 (θ,X)
=
∫
R′
1
π(a|u)h(u|X, θ)
q(u)
q(u)du+
∫
R′
2
min{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)}h(u|X, θ)
q(u)
q(u)du (27)
and
Ha2 (θ,X)
=
∫
R′
1
π(a|u)h(u|X, θ)
q(u)
q(u)du+
∫
R′
2
max{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)}h(u|X, θ)
q(u)
q(u)du (28)
We can then simulate Ha1 (θ,X) and H
a
2 (θ,X) by drawing random variables
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(u1, ..., uns, ..., uNS) from the importance density q(u), note that here uns is a vector,
it contains the utility for all the players of the underlying game. Based on these simu-
lated utility values, the importance sampling simulators for Ha1 (θ,X) and H
a
2 (θ,X) are
H˜a1 (θ,X) and H˜
a
2 (θ,X), respectively.
H˜a1 (θ,X) =
1
NS
∑
ns
I(uns ∈ R′1)π(a|uns)h(u
ns|X,θ)
q(uns)
+
1
NS
∑
ns
I(uns ∈ R′2)min{π(a|uns) : π ∈ Sπ(uns)}h(u
ns|X,θ)
q(uns)
(29)
H˜a2 (θ,X) =
1
NS
∑
ns
I(uns ∈ R′1)π(a|uns)h(u
ns|X,θ)
q(uns)
+
1
NS
∑
ns
I(uns ∈ R′2)max{π(a|uns) : π ∈ Sπ(uns)}h(u
ns|X,θ)
q(uns)
(30)
From the theory of importance sampling, H˜a1 (θ,X) and H˜
a
2 (θ,X) are unbiased simulators
for Ha1 (θ,X) and H
a
2 (θ,X), respectively. The most important property of these simulator
is that they will generally be continuous in the parameter θ since it only depends on θ
through h(u|x, θ) which is continuos in θ given that g(ǫ|θ2) is continuous.
Although the theory of importance sampling proves that are smooth and unbiased
simulator for any choice of the importance density q(u) which has sufficiently large sup-
port. However, as noted by Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010), as a practical matter, it is
important to make sure that the tails of the importance density are not too thin in a
neighborhood of the parameter which optimizes the objective function in our estimation
procedure. We suggest to use some pre-estimated θ˚ to construct the importance density
q(u) = h(u|X, θ˚) (31)
where can be obtained from the estimates of the game with incomplete information
which is studied in Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2010), or through the gen-
eralized maximum entropy estimator for the static games of complete information
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(Golan, Karp, and Perloff, 2000). Note that these two studies on empirical games both
are based on the Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Estimation
Given the simulators obtained from the importance sampling, H˜a1 (θ,X) and H˜
a
2 (θ,X),
for Ha1 (θ,X) and H
a
2 (θ,X), respectively, introducing following notations:
H˜1(θ,X) = (H˜
1
1 (θ,X), ..., H˜
a
1 (θ,X), ..., H˜
#A
1 (θ,X))
′
H˜2(θ,X) = (H˜
1
2 (θ,X), ..., H˜
a
2 (θ,X), ..., H˜
#A
2 (θ,X))
′
From (23) we get the following simulated moment inequality restrictions:
E[H˜1(θ,Xt)] ≤ E[Pr(y|xt)] ≤ E[H˜2(θ,Xt)] (32)
According to Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), our inferential procedures uses the
objective function6:
min
θ∈Θ
Q(θ) ≡
∫ ∥∥∥(Pr(y|x)− H˜1(θ,X))−∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥(Pr(y|x)− H˜2(θ,X))+∥∥∥2 dFx (33)
this criterion function (32), that is if Pr(y|x) < H˜1(θ,X), then∥∥∥(Pr(y|x)− H˜1(θ,X))−∥∥∥2 is strictly positive, and if Pr(y|x) > H˜2 (θ,X), then∥∥∥(Pr(y|x)− H˜2(θ,X))+∥∥∥2 is strictly positive. It is easy to see that Q(θ) ≥ 0 for all
θ ∈ Θ and that Q(θ) = 0 if and only if θ ∈ ΘO.
To estimate the outer identified set ΘO, we need to take a sample analog of Q(θ). First
6Let ‖ x ‖+=‖ (x)+ ‖ and ‖ x ‖−=‖ (x)− ‖, where (x)+ := max(x, 0), (x)− := max(−x, 0) and ‖ · ‖
is the Euclidian norm.
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replace Pr(y|x) with a
√
T consistent estimator PT (X)
7. The sample analog for Q(θ) is
QT (θ) =
1
T 2
T∑
t=1
[∥∥∥((PT (Xt)− H˜1(θ,Xt))−∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥PT (Xt)− H˜2(θ,Xt))+∥∥∥2
]
(34)
Our estimation for ΘO is any solution that minimizing (34), which can be obtained from:
ΘˆO = {θ ∈ Θ : TQT (θ) ≤ vT } (35)
where vT → ∞ and vTT → 0, Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) propose a resam-
pling method to get suitable vT .
Theorem 2 Let Assumption 3 hold. Suppose that the regular conditions of the Theorem
3.1 in hold. Then we have that ΘˆO is a Hausdorff consistent estimator for ΘO, that is
dH(ΘˆO,ΘO) = 0 with probability one.
The proof of Theorem is the same as the Theorem 3.1 in
Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007). To conduct inference about the above
moment inequalities model, we use the methodology of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer
(2007) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). We conduct a set CT for a prespecified α ∈ (0, 1)
such that
lim
T→∞
(θO ∈ CT ) ≥ α for any θO ∈ ΘO (36)
Which can be constructed as follows, Let
CT (c) =
{
θ ∈ Θ : T
(
QT (θ)−min
z
QT (z)
)
≤ c
}
(37)
Then do the following loop:
7The convergence rate of nonparametric estimates for PT (X) is slower than
√
T when there are
continuos variables in x, a useful method is to discretize all the variables in x and use the nonparametric
frequency estimation.
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1. compute a initial estimate for ΘO as CT (c0), for example CT (c0) = CT (0), then
subsampling the statistics T (QT (θ)−minz QT (z)) for θ ∈ CT (0) and obtain the
estimate of its α-quantile, c1(θ0).
2. Update c through c1 = supθ0∈CT (c0) c1(θ0) and formulate CT (c1) as step 1.
3. Let c0 = c1 then obtain c2.
Then CT (c2) will be our confidence region for ΘˆO. See Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer
(2007) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) for more on this. Such confidence region does
not only have the desired coverage property, but will also be consistent in the sense of
Theorem .
4.3 Computation of the Equilibria
The simulated lower and upper bounds, Ha1 (θ,X) and H˜
a
2 (θ,X), e.g., (29) and (30),
contain the following equilibrium computation:
I(u ∈ R′1)π(a|u) (38)
I(u ∈ R′2)min{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)} (39)
and
I(u ∈ R′2)max{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)} (40)
where u is a vector which contains the utility levels of all the players for each action
profile. We first discuss the computation of (39) and (40), where the corresponding game
admits multiple equilibria. First note that if we can identify the regions R′1 and R
′
2, then
we only need to compute
min
π
{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)} (41)
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where the solution is the correlated equilibrium that puts the lowest probability for action
profile a, and
max
π
{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)} (42)
where the solution is the correlated equilibrium that puts the highest probability for
action profile a. Both of them can be obtained through simple linear programming. For
min{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)}, it can be obtained from
min
π
π(k)
s.t.


∑
a−i
ui(a−i, ai)π(a−i, ai) ≥
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, a˜i)π(a−i, ai), ∀i, ai and a˜i 6= ai
∑
a∈A
π(a) = 1, π(a) ≥ 0
(43)
and max{π(a|u) : π ∈ Sπ(u)} can be obtained from
max
π
π(a)
s.t.


∑
a−i
ui(a−i, ai)π(a−i, ai) ≥
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, a˜i)π(a−i, ai), ∀i, ai and a˜i 6= ai
∑
a∈A
π(a) = 1, π(a) ≥ 0
(44)
While the game only admits unique equilibrium, then the solution for the system of linear
inequalities:
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, ai)π(a−i, ai) ≥
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, a˜i)π(a−i, ai), ∀i, ai and a˜i 6= ai
∑
a∈A
π(a) = 1, π(a) ≥ 0
(45)
is unique, thus either linear programming (43) or (44) both can provide this unique equi-
librium, which means that in practice, we do not need to identify the regions based on
whether there are multiple equilibria, the only computation we need to do is linear pro-
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gramming (43) or (44). Clearly, the computation of equilibria in our procedure is very
simple, it only needs linear programming! While most other studies which focus on the
empirical complete information games based on Nash equilibrium, need to compute all the
Nash equilibrium of underlying games, for the general game, this will induce a heavy com-
putational burden. See for example, Berry and Tamer (2007), Bajari, Hong, and Ryan
(2010) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009).
5 Test of Equilibrium Concepts
In this paper, we based on the correlated equilibrium study the identification and esti-
mation of empirical static complete information game, where the multiple equilibria is
an important issue to deal with. Actually, not only the equilibrium of a given game can
be multiple, but also the equilibrium concept. Such as pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
mixed strategy equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, evolutionary equilibrium and so on,
besides the theoretical research, it is an interesting problem that testing which equilib-
rium concept is the most consistent with the real data. Given that there are existing
research based on Nash equilibrium, and we study the same issue based on correlated
equilibrium, we can conduct a formal test for the equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium
versus correlated equilibrium.
Formally, Let CE denote the complete information static game based correlated equi-
librium, and NE denote the same game based on Nash equilibrium. Since both of the
two models can be characterized by moment inequality restrictions, then
CE =
⋃
θ∈Θ
CEθ; NE =
⋃
β∈B
NEβ (46)
where
CEθ = {CE : ECEmj(Xi, θ) ≥ 0, j ∈ JCE} (47)
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NEβ = {NE : ENEgj(Xi, β) ≥ 0, j ∈ JNE} (48)
where {Xi ∈ X}ni=1 is the sample generated from distribution µ, mj(Xi, θ) and gj(Xi, β)
are moment functions characterized by finite dimensional parameter θ and β, respec-
tively. Then ECEmj(Xi, θ) ≥ 0 is equivalent to the moment inequalities (22), while
ENEgj(Xi, β) ≥ 0 can be explained as the moment conditions in Ciliberto and Tamer
(2009)8.
Given the above structure of the two models, we want to test the two distribution
CE and NE , which is closer to the true distribution µ. Since both of the two models
are defined in terms of moment inequality restrictions, we can make use of the test for
moment inequality models developed in Shi (2010). Consider the null hypothesis:
H0 : d(CE , µ) = d(NE, µ) (49)
where
d(CE , µ) = inf
CE∈CE
d(CE, µ); d(NE, µ) = inf
NE∈NE
d(NE, µ) (50)
The distance d(P, µ) is defined as the Kullback-Leibler divergence measure:
d(P, µ) =
∫
pµ log pµdµ (51)
where pµ is the density of P with respect to µ. To construct the test statistics, For a data
distribution µ, define the Lagrange multipliers:
γ∗µ(θ) = argmin
γ
exp(γ′m(Xi, θ)) (52)
λ∗µ(β) = argmin
λ
exp(λ′g(Xi, β)) (53)
8The moment conditions in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) are based on the pure strategy Nash equi-
librium, to obtain the moment conditions for Nash equilibrium, one needs to extend that result.
Berry and Tamer (2007) briefly discussed the problem that arise when allowing for mixed strategies.
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and criterion functions:
Mµ(γ, θ) = Eµ exp(γ′m(Xi, θ)) (54)
Gµ(λ, β) = Eµ exp(λ′g(Xi, β)) (55)
Shi (2010) prove that the null hypothesis (49) can be stated as:
H0 : max
θ∈Θ
Mµ(γ∗µ(θ), θ) = max
β∈B
Gµ(λ∗µ(β), β) (56)
The sample analog of Mµ(γ∗µ(θ), θ) and Gµ(λ∗µ(β), β) are:
Mˆn(γ, θ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
exp(γ′m(Xi, θ)); Gˆn(λ, β) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
exp(λ′g(Xi, β)) (57)
where
γˆn(θ) = argmin
γ
Mˆn(γ, θ), λˆn(β) = argmin
λ
Gˆn(λ, β)
Θˆn = argmax
θ∈Θ
Mˆn(γˆn(θ), θ) Bˆn = argmax
β∈B
Gˆn(λˆn(β), β)
(58)
Then we can based on the quasi-likelihood ratio statistics
QLRn = max
θ∈Θ
Mˆn(γˆn(θ), θ)−max
β∈B
Gˆn(λˆn(β), β) (59)
to test the null hypothesis (56).
With several regular conditions, Shi (2010) prove that under H0:
QLRn
d
 N(0, ̟2n) (60)
where ̟2n = Eµ[exp(γ
∗
µ(θ
∗)′m(Xi, θ
∗)) − exp(λ∗n(β∗)′g(Xi, β∗))]2, θ∗ ∈
argmaxθ∈ΘMµ(γ∗µ(θ), θ), β∗ ∈ argmaxβ∈B Gµ(λ∗µ(β), β). While in practice, ̟2n can
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be replaced with its sample analog ˆ̟ 2n:
ˆ̟ 2n = sup
θ∈Θˆn,β∈Bˆn
1
n
∑
µ
[exp(γˆn(θ)
′m(Xi, θ))− exp(λˆn(β)′g(Xi, β))]2 (61)
Then the test criterion is
Test of Correlated Equilibrium versus Nash Equilibrium Let bn be a sequence of
positive numbers such that b−1n + n
−1bn → 0. Given the nominal size α and the
(1− α/2) quantile of the standard normal distribution, zα/2.
(1) If n ˆ̟ 2n > bn and n
1
2QLRn/ ˆ̟ n > zα/2, then reject the null H0 and accept correlated
equilibrium as the equilibrium concept.
(2) If n ˆ̟ 2n > bn and n
1
2QLRn/ ˆ̟ n < −zα/2, then reject the null H0 and accept Nash
equilibrium as the equilibrium concept.
(3) If ˆ̟ 2n and n
1
2QLRn/ ˆ̟ n do not satisfy the condition in (1) and (2), then accept the
null H0.
This test criterion is based on the nested model selection test of Shi (2010). Re-
member the Proposition 2.1, which states that Nash equilibrium is a subset of correlated
equilibrium, which means that we have NE ⊂ CE but not CE ⊂ NE . An interesting case
is that if the test suggest us to accept the null hypothesis, which means that correlated
equilibrium and Nash equilibrium do the same explanation for the real data, then all the
correlated equilibrium of the underlying game are all the Nash equilibrium, according to
Proposition 2.2, we can find that, in this case, the underlying game has unique correlated
equilibrium, and thus, has unique Nash equilibrium. Finally, the property of nest between
correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium means that based on correlated equilibrium
to estimate empirical games is robust, while when the true equilibrium concept is Nash
equilibrium, it is inefficient, while the true equilibrium concept is correlated equilibrium,
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except the special case that the game only admits unique equilibrium, based on Nash
equilibrium to estimate the game will get the inconsistent estimation. This is similar to
the choice between fixed effect and random effect in panel data models.
6 Monte Carlo Simulation
To demonstrate the performance of our estimates in finite samples, we conduct a Monte
Carlo experiment using a simple 2 × 2 game. In each of the T repetitions of the
simultaneous-move game with complete information, each has the following structure:
0 1
0 (0, 0) (0, ǫ2(0, 1))
1 (ǫ1(1, 0), 0) (θ1 + ǫ1(1, 1), θ2 + ǫ2(1, 1))
Which can be explained as a static entry game, the action set of each player is Ai = {0, 1},
where 0 means no entry and 1 means entry. The utility function for player i is defined as:
ui(a, ǫi(a); θ) = I(ai = 1)(θ1a−i + ǫi(a)) (62)
As a simple experiment, we have not included any exogenous covariates x here. And
according the location and scale normalization, we set the utility of no entry as 0 and
the variance of the random preference shock as 1. Then we only need to estimate the
strategic effect parameters θ1 and θ2.
All random preference shocks ǫ1t(1, 0), ǫ2t(0, 1), ǫ1t(1, 1) and ǫ2t(1, 1) are independently
drawn from standard normal distribution. The parameter space Θ is set to Θ = [−5, 5]2,
and there true values are:
θ1 = −0.5; θ2 = −1 (63)
30
Which means that the entry of player i will decrease the payoff of player j given the entry
of player j. Given these random shocks and parameters, we generate the outcome of
each game, e.g., the observed action profiles, by a simple maximum entropy equilibrium
selection mechanism:
max
π
−
∑
a∈A
π(a) ln π(a)
s.t.


∑
a−i
ui(a−i, ai)π(a−i, ai) ≥
∑
a−i
ui(a−i, a˜i)π(a−i, ai), ∀i, ai and a˜i 6= ai
∑
a∈A
π(a) = 1, π(a) ≥ 0
(64)
Obviously, this maximum entropy equilibrium selection mechanism will generate a most
dispersive correlated equilibrium π∗ among all correlated equilibria. According to π∗, we
use a simple random sampling to determine which action profile will be played. Based on
the maximum entropy equilibrium selection mechanism, under the sample size 500, the
E[Pr(yt)] is:
E[Pr(yt)] = (0.291058, 0.274005, 0.35475, 0.080187) (65)
Note that although we set the true value for parameters as θ1 = −0.5 and θ2 = −1,
but only if we know the equilibrium selection mechanism, the point identification can be
achieved, and thus we can compare our estimates with the true value of parameters. In
practice, usually, we’ve no information about the equilibrium selection mechanism, thus
there may a lot of values of the parameter that can generate the data we observed. We
use the following procedure to do the set estimation (35), first, based on the simulated
annealing algorithm to find the optimal solution of the minimization of (34), denote it
as θ˜; then in the parameter space Θ choosing rich directions9 to the grid search until it
condition (35)
9In this experiment, we choose 402 directions, which are randomly chosen according to a uniform
distribution over [0, 2pi].
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Table 1: The Results of Monte Carlo Simulation
Initial Value for Set estimation Interval Estimates
T = 500
θ1 −0.5677 [−2.3142, 0.9580]
θ2 −1.0273 [−2.8319, 0.4027]
T = 1000
θ1 −0.5659 [−2.2794, 0.9370]
θ2 −1.0267 [−2.8184, 0.3816]
Monte Carlo Times: 1000
Importance Sampling Times: 999
We generate 1000 samples of size T = 500, 1000 to assess the finite sample properties
of our estimator, first use importance sampling simulator get simulated bounds of choice
probability, then based on the above numerical procedure find the final estimates. The
interval estimates are reported in Table 1, and the whole set estimators for T = 500 and
1000 are reported in Figure 1 and 2, both are compact sets in R2 space. We also report
the comparison between the two different sample size in Figure 3, where red denotes the
for T = 500 and blue for T = 1000. Since we lack the information of the true range of the
outer identified set, we can not say much about the performance of our estimator, while
we conclude that the true value of the parameter lies in our estimated set. Moreover,
from Figure 3 we can find that when the sample size increase, the range of ΘˆO decrease,
which is similar to the convergence in the point identified case.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a framework for identifying and estimating the normal-form
payoff parameters of a simultaneous, discrete game of complete information where the
equilibrium concept employed is correlated equilibrium. Comparing with the existing
studies based on Nash equilibrium, this extension of the equilibrium concepts simplifies
the identification and estimation of game-theoretic econometric models, since our ap-
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Figure 2: The Set Estimate of ΘˆO when T = 500
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Figure 3: The Set Estimate of ΘˆO when T = 1000
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Figure 4: The Comparison of ΘˆO between Different Sample Size
proach does not require the computation of the whole set of equilibria, it only needs some
”extreme” equilibria which can be obtained through linear programming. To deal with
the presence of multiple equilibria, we make use of the moment inequality restrictions in-
duced by the underlying game-theoretic econometric models without making equilibrium
selection assumptions, which avoids the misspecification of equilibrium selection mecha-
nisms, and leads to a partial identified model. Given the outer identified set characterized
by moment restrictions, the set estimator developed by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer
(2007) is used to obtain its estimates. The importance sampling technique is used to
reduce computational burden and overcome the non-smoothness problems. We also show
that the model selection tests for moment inequality models developed by Shi (2010) can
be used to test equilibrium concepts such as correlated equilibrium versus Nash equilib-
rium. The most limitation of our estimation is that it relies on the known distribution
of random preference shocks which is rarely known to researchers, working with the un-
known distribution is an important topic for future research. Another possible extension
34
is that updating our estimator to the one based on conditional moment restriction.
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